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Abstract 
 
Two conceptual theories of river basin management are discussed.  One is integrated 
river basin management with an apex regulatory authority that seeks hydrometric data 
collection and analysis to use in decisions over water allocation. This model of IRBM can 
be identified in training curricula and many derivatives of basin management 
programmes. The other, termed ‘polycentric river basin management’ is institutionally, 
organisationally and geographically more decentralised, constructed from four ideas of 
scale/form, a risk-based approach, hydrograph regime dissection and work scheduling. 
This model emphases conflict resolution, problem-solving, informality and step-wise 
adjustments of flows to different sectors. The polycentric model answers the question of 
how to make tangible progress in basins where data monitoring is limited, basin office 
resources are constrained and integrated planning has stalled. To explore these issues, 
we employ the ‘The Cathedral and The Bazaar’ metaphor of Eric Raymond who depicted 
two ways of writing computer code, one ‘in house’ drawn up by company employees, the 
other ‘open-source’, written by many contributors. Aware of inaccuracies, we feel 
compelled to so package our argument to bring new thinking to river basin 
management and governance theory. The discussion is informed by observations from 
Tanzania, Nigeria and the UK.  
 
Keywords: Adaptive, integrated, conflict resolution, data, governance, monitoring, 
regulatory management, river basin management, Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
 
Introduction 
In attempting to achieve pressing priorities of more equitable, efficient and sustainable 
water management, countries across sub-Saharan Africa are instituting reforms with the 
support of the international donor community.  Under the banner of Integrated Water 
Resource Management (IWRM) these reforms applied to the river basin emphasise the 
role of statutory laws and formal institutional frameworks to regulate the use of water 
resources (IWMI et al 2004, Jones and van der Walt 2004, Kabudi 2005, Sokile et al 2005; 
Pitman 2004). The reforms translate into an operational reality of resource ownership 
vested in the state with varying levels of stakeholder participation and subsidiarity in 
water use decisions, and the issuing of permits and charges, enforced by legal sanctions, 
to prevent conflict and resource deterioration.  Although academics are mixed in their 
views of IWRM and ‘Integrated River Basin Management’ (IRBM), both feature as 
guiding philosophies of the international donor community’s approach to water (EU 
2005, Bonn Secretariat 2001, World Bank 2004). The Global Water Partnership (GWP, 
2000) provides a generally accepted definition of IWRM as being a process that 
“…maximises the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems”. The concept is underpinned by ‘the 
Dublin Principles’ which propose that water should be considered as a finite and 
vulnerable resource; be managed on a participatory basis; place women in a central role; 
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and be recognised as an economic good. IRBM is a response to the interconnectedness of 
the water cycle at the catchment and aquifer scale, requiring that the full range of water 
users, their needs and impacts should be considered together at both a policy and 
practical level, in order to achieve equitable, efficient and sustainable water use. 
 
Although IRBM is being rolled out to many developing countries its application in the 
field is coming under increasing review. This concern was part of the recent World 
Water Forum (GWP 2006), and has been discussed by various authors (e.g. Biswas, 
2004). ‘Adaptive water management’ is one emerging response, as evidenced by current 
literature and meetings (CAIWA 2007). Although the adaptive literature might explain 
how IWRM is interpreted, it does not to fundamentally question the basin approach, 
instead: “adaptive management is an approach to managing natural resources that 
encourages learning from the implementation of policies and strategies” (Allan and 
Curtis, 2005; 414; see also Kashyap, 2004; and Lankford, et al, 2007).   
 
This paper is guided by a key question1; do conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
undo the rationale for a regulatory integrated river basin approach? Conditions such as 
large distances, high evaporation losses, an institutionally challenging environment 
(Cleaver and Franks, 2005), lack of data monitoring and little recycling or reticulation of 
water suggest, in total, a challenging environment. In other words, basin-wide 
integrated responses may be too cumbersome to meaningfully cope with local variety 
and dynamics.  
 
By asking this question, we believe that a flaw in integrated river basin management is 
revealed when it is applied to certain African river basins. The flaw appears to be that 
the ‘theory-practice’ dichotomy of IRBM has not overcome (or perhaps has even lead to) 
inertia and ineffective progress with basin management.  This ‘ontological’ nature of 
IRBM is as a theory of intending to plan for the integration of supply and demand over a 
large basin achieved by integrated regulatory approaches which is then interpreted at 
the practice level as basin operations of the same.  The consequences of highly 
comprehensive integrated planning are operations that are too comprehensive to be 
easily implemented.    
 
However, given that adaptation management defines and refines the 
practice/operational level but not the theory, adaptation of IRBM cannot generate a 
categorically different and perhaps more relevant approach. In this paper, we explore 
whether a genuinely different approach to water resources management exists at the 
higher strategic level, which in turn might spawn an alternative operational model. 
Thus, we question the theory rather than practice of IRBM.  We will argue, that by 
‘disintegrating’ the basin management challenge into parts rather than integrating it into 
                                                 
1 The paper explores other topical issues; the relationship between conflict resolution and river basin 
management; connections between data, decision aids and river basin management paradigms; and 
relationships between irrigation infrastructure and basin management. 
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a whole, programmes can focus on pursuing immediate solutions to problems that river 
basin societies face, encapsulating cost-effectiveness, local knowledge and appropriate 
water technology.  In keeping with emerging work in this area (Molle, 2006; Molle et al, 
2007) this alternative is termed ‘polycentric river basin management’ (PRBM) because of 
its emphasis on a completely different set of principles built around decentralised, 
nested solutions that tackle local-scale issues.  
 
To some extent the two comparisons are captured by the ‘Cathedral and the Bazaar’ 
allegory of Eric Raymond who in 1997 contrasted proprietary computer code written by 
in-house developers and protected by copyright law (the Cathedral) with decentralized, 
open-source coding written by many unrelated individuals (the Bazaar). We hesitate to 
suggest that open source coding enabled by instant access via an intra/internet equates 
to the resource water which by its very nature is not immediately and simultaneously 
accessible or knowable by all. Yet, the comparison applies not to the resource/source but 
to the construction of knowledge and human interaction around it – the terms are 
powerful abstractions of two different paradigms of organisational management (see 
also ‘rhizomes and trees’ metaphor of Deleuze and Guattari, 1988).  In the paper here, 
we attach the ‘cathedral’ term to integrated water resources management expressed at 
the basin-wide level, and ‘bazaar’ to a polycentric model of water management that 
focuses on nested zones or catchments within basins.  The paper is structured so that we 
first explore the characteristics of the ‘cathedral’ before moving to a critique of its 
weaknesses which in turn precedes the exposition of an alternative ‘bazaar’ model 
leading to final discussion and conclusions on certitude regarding basin management.   
 
The basin-wide regulatory approach (‘Cathedral’) 
Characterised here as Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM), this governance 
model uses statutory control (permits, prohibitions and charges enforced by legal 
sanctions) of water abstractions and discharges (water transactions) following due 
consideration of other water users’ needs. Although there are elements of stakeholder 
participation, IRBM predominantly uses a ‘command and control’ regulatory regime to 
manage demand and maintain quality and quantity of supply across a river basin. IRBM 
requires regulatory organisations to acquire a decision-making process to resolve 
whether a water transaction can take place, drafting and issuing a legal ‘permit’ of water 
use specifying the conditions and ‘policing’ compliance through monitoring and 
enforcement. Key features of the IWRM model are a reliance on surveys (see for 
example, Ramsar utilising Dickens et al 2004), data, science-based decision support 
systems and the charging of water users to recover the operational costs of water 
resource regulation. 
 
Because the aim is to cover quite large river basins as single units (e.g. the Pangani Basin 
in Northern Tanzania) the normative model of basin management tends towards a 
hierarchical design.  Lower level user groups are represented in higher groups who in 
turn can be represented at the apex authority.  The hierarchy is seen as sensible because 
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water supply and demand in a river basin manifests itself as an additive common 
resource. The total supply needs to be quantified and added up to be balanced against 
the total demand, so that excessive demand can be regulated. Similarly, water quality 
objectives are targeted via monitoring and imposition of wastewater discharge 
standards. A central viewpoint is deemed necessary to explore trade-offs between users 
and supplies that may be very distant from each other.  
 
An example of these reforms can be found in Tanzania (World Bank 1996, 2004). The 
government of Tanzania and the World Bank saw IWRM implementation as a 
fundamental pre-requisite to achieving the country’s development goals. Institutional 
reform is based around new water resource law that is almost a facsimile of that in the 
UK.  Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are also exploring IWRM reform in river basin 
applications; e.g. Zambezi River Authority; Rufiji River Basin Office in Tanzania; 
Catchment Management Agencies in South Africa; Volta River Authority; and the Mara 
River Basin Management Initiative in Kenya.   
  
Hofwegan and Jaspers (1999) and Jaspers (2003) outline the Cathedral IRBM model, 
listing constitutional changes and providing a formidable list of organisational and 
operational functionalities that must be in place for water management to be successful. 
A small sample of these include: a decision-making capacity which reflects the interests 
of different uses and users; a clear regulatory framework with norms and standards; a 
system that provides reliable information on the availability, use and quality of surface 
and ground water in the basin; a system that allows analysis of several scenarios for 
interventions in use of water at basin level; an effective and transparent accountability 
mechanism; sufficient capable people to meet the IWRM demands on planning and 
management, water resources assessment (quality and quantity); problem analysis; 
activity analysis; demand analysis and demand forecasting; formulation of objectives 
and constraints; design of alternative water resource systems; system analysis; system 
simulation and optimisation; sensitivity analysis; multi criteria and multi constraint 
trade-off analysis; involvement of stakeholders; allocation of water resources; demand 
management; administration of service provision to water institutions; operation and 
maintenance; monitoring and evaluation; financial management and performance 
auditing; and communication, negotiation and conflict resolution. Whilst admirable in 
ambition and comprehensiveness we ask how realistic such a comprehensive approach 
given the realities and contextual constraints facing developing countries? 
 
Normative integrated water resources management is perhaps best recognised via its 
manifestation in training programmes, which are widespread (with training provided 
by Ramboll Natura, SwissRE, Stirling University, University of Wales, Global Water 
Partnership (GWP), CDA Consulting, Bern University of Applied Sciences to name a 
few). Curricula content includes many of the items listed in the previous paragraph.  
Furthermore, policy documents are also places where normative regulatory IWRM can 
be found.  A web search of GWP, World Water Council, UNESCO, Ramsar, IWMI and 
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UNEP provide policy thinking that mirrors the kinds of approaches found in training 
courses.  IWRM is also evident in practitioner-to-practitioner capacity building 
initiatives in 2005-2007 between environmental institutions in East and South Africa and 
the United Kingdom’s Environmental Agency. Here, predominantly hierarchical models 
of regulation and enforcement were mapped from the UK to the very different contexts 
found in sub-Saharan Africa, although refinements followed when constraints in Kenya 
demanded a rethink.   
 
Examining the training and policy tools of IWRM is not simply a device for listing the 
components of IWRM.  It is germane to the argument that ‘cathedral style’ IWRM is 
given significant credibility when and where training and policy on water resources 
management is formulated.  The mode of training and subject material are inter-linked.  
During training, a self-referencing edifice of IWRM is provided, reverting to core 
principles, planning modes, structures, linkages, objectives that need to be put in place. 
Such training and policy resources appear authoritative and knowledge-based, 
providing participants with the viewpoint that large river basins should be addressed 
via a large range of inter-linked ‘integrated’ activities.   
 
Furthermore, endorsement of this normative approach receives significant levels of 
financial support through donor programmes with workshops constituting the strategic 
location for its promotion. Does this result in the requisite reflective learning? With 
‘numbers of delegates trained’ often used as an indicator of success, a workshop culture 
is perversely fostered by receipt of an equivalent week’s salary for one day’s attendance. 
Yet, at one recent World Bank-funded workshop2 in Tanzania, a senior World Bank 
water resources specialist insisted and was later repeated by the Ministry of Water’s 
Director of Water Resources, that “water resource management is impossible without 
data”.  Notwithstanding the skewed incentives this provides to staff, with such 
persuasive backing there seems little room for dissention from this kind of IWRM 
message. 
 
Questioning the regulatory IWRM template 
Two related questions follow: first we must ask whether basin officers, workshop 
participants and trainees are able to distinguish between detail given regarding the 
principles and planning of basin management and detail given for implementing basin 
management, particularly when the trainers and policy documents do not provide this 
distinction.  Secondly, we must especially ask whether the regulatory model should 
necessarily be the dominant planning version; in other words whether it functions well in 
all river basins, particularly some that are located in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
Questionable basins are generally large, between 15 to 150 thousand square kilometres 
and comprising disparate communities, institutions and environments.  Evaporation 
                                                 
2 The workshop was estimated to cost the same as the government’s entire annual operational allocation 
to its largest river basin office.  
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rates of 6-9 millimetres in Sub-Saharan basins and irrigation systems as compared to 
rates of 2-5 millimetres northern Europe frame a markedly different and less forgiving 
‘demand-side’ dynamic.  Agro-meteorology and geologies combine to create higher 
degrees of seasonality of surface waters in the savannah plains and watersheds of SSA. 
In addition, the basins’ regulatory organisations, logistics and infrastructure for 
monitoring both demand and supply are generally under-resourced.  Such basins are 
very different from those found in Western Europe that experience temperate/oceanic 
climates and where authorities have access to considerable financial, human, transport 
and technological capabilities which allow them to fulfil their duties according to 
accepted standards and protocols associated with IWRM (while the UK’s Environment 
Agency has approximately 11,000 staff, Kenya’s equivalent has less than 50).  Yet it is 
from these well-resourced situations that policy templates and curricula for IWRM in 
poorly financed and resourced river basins are exported.  The appropriateness of the 
regulatory model to the latter is a question that should be posed more deeply (Carter, 
1998); given that implementation of IWRM will be extremely challenging due to a 
capacity and information vacuum (World Bank 2005).    
 
However, such is the prevalence and multi-component nature of the regulatory model 
that basin stakeholders are not asking whether alternative basin approaches might exist, 
but how to assemble the provisions necessary to implement the regulatory model.  At a 
river basin workshop in Nigeria (Lankford 2005), participants were asked to consider 
what they could do in the short term to allocate water between urban, agricultural and 
wetland sectors.  Respondents drew up long lists of actions that constituted ‘regulatory 
river basin management’ rather than immediate ‘make-do’ steps to resolve pressing 
conflicts. When asked at a recent seminar in London how the Environment Agency 
would manage a river basin in East Africa that had no monitoring network, the answer 
given was to set up a monitoring network (Hepworth, 2007). This is sensible provided 
the cost, sustainability and usefulness of such a network are assured. However, 
networks for river data collection in Africa are in a poor state (ECA, 2000), rehabilitation 
efforts are short-lived, and data often goes uncollected or un-analysed. So the question 
remains, how can a river basin be managed if very little or no data remains the de facto 
situation?  
 
The lack of data collection and analysis is not the only reason why a regulatory model 
should be thoroughly questioned.  As well as practical limitations, five substantive 
issues can be identified regarding the fit of the regulatory model to certain basin 
environments.  The first relates to degree of dynamism found.  The applicability of a 
model built upon relatively fixed regulations in an environment where water supply 
and demand fluctuates both intra-seasonally and inter-annually, and where the demand 
curve is often increasing is questionable (Lankford and Beale 2006). In some African 
basins, the pace of change is very quick – for example incomers to irrigation systems and 
urban growth – lead to rapidly changing demand for water.  Thus regulatory formality 
may date quickly which partly explains its mixed record in Tanzania - on various 
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functional levels, water rights have not performed according to expectations (van 
Koppen et al 2003). We believe these differences between assumptions and reality are 
not simply down to the administration of water rights issuance, but testify to greater 
theoretical challenges regarding how river basins should be managed.  This challenge 
will magnify as basins experience increased variability stemming from climate change.   
 
Secondly, efforts to replicate a working regulatory regime optimistically assume that the 
contextual pre-requisites of a functional and fair judicial system and associated 
procedural capabilities that provide legal authority to the regulators are already in 
place. For those with experience of the realities of legal machinations in many 
developing countries in SSA this is clearly not the case.  Petty and institutional 
corruption, the practical impossibility of intra-government litigation, prejudicial 
prosecution of the poor who have restricted opportunities for compliance, fear of 
community revolt and political backlashes against enforcement together with 
procedural defects all conspire to emasculate the incentives associated with regulatory 
compliance.  As the Managing Director of an openly polluting industry in Tanzania puts 
it “the biggest problem with water management here is corruption. There is a system 
but nobody follows it.  It is possible to pay off anybody for anything” (Hepworth, 2007).  
Or to take the view from the regulators hamstrung by political patronage of polluting 
businesses, as one senior official puts it; “There are many powerful men twisting our 
arms.- we cannot do anything on enforcement”.  The failure of the regulatory route is 
evidenced by the track record of Tanzanian water pollution control legislation over its 
32 year history, which was exercised once resulting in a 30 dollar fine.  Whilst tackling 
corruption forms an ongoing development objective (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 
2006), we argue that its role in undermining regulatory water management is likely to 
persist at least in the medium term. Therefore what management modalities, which 
acknowledge the existence of corruption and perhaps draws in community-based 
reflexive law3, best serve pressing water problems?  
 
Thirdly, the deployment of non-regulatory solutions resonates with the reality of 
pragmatic water management in the UK. In a largely regulatory environment, basin 
officers made real improvements by omitting the strict regulatory pathway, reverting 
instead to dialogue and discussion. Similar examples were found in the Rufiji Basin 
Water Office in Tanzania, where officers opted to engage users in dialogue rather then 
via the courts. We describe this interpretative action ‘personality authority’, denoting a 
personal engagement with problems, and drawing from authority that arises from a 
person’s character rather than their office. This illustrates Weber’s contrasting of 
                                                 
3 Reflexive law describes an array of agreements constituted from within organisation and communities 
rather than imposed from outside.  Reflexive law therefore covers informal customary law, and newly 
instituted bye-laws. 
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legitimacy and authority (1947, 1958)4. The law exists as a bargaining chip and ultimate 
sanction but the main objective is not the application of the law per se but to help water 
users become more efficient and environmentally-cognisant by providing practical 
advice recognising their logistical, economic and capacity constraints.  Prevention of 
conflict or environmental damage is seen as more preferable to initiating prosecution, 
being less costly for the regulator and water with legal enforcement action only used as 
a last resort (c.f. the motto of experienced Basin Water Officers “you can get a lot more 
done by not upsetting anybody”). Progress in solving major water use issues is 
commonly made incrementally rather than in leaps, often negotiated on non-
confrontational terms. Such an approach has benefited the UK’s Environment Agency. 
What exists is not carteblanche for regulators to apply the law or not as they see fit, but 
within certain constraints (to ensure consistency and credibility of the authority) there is 
room for the regulatory officers to build relationships and dialogues with and between 
water users, interpreting their needs and that of the environment in a dynamic way 
based on a first hand knowledge of the natural resource. Clearly, experienced basin 
officers know when to shift between ‘cathedral’ and ‘bazaar’ modes, but what are these 
same officers in Sub-Saharan Africa to make of new IRBM projects funded by donors 
and constructed by consultants whose reports (e.g. World Bank, 1996) outline 
procedures that are mostly regulatory upon which monitoring is conducted and further 
funding contingent? 
 
Fourthly, risk-based approaches have achieved real improvements in water 
management. Here, a few key issues that unlock success are pursued. The UK’s 
Environment Agency (see EA 2006) teaches risk-based ideas in its training in Kenya and 
Tanzania.  While this denotes a pragmatic identification of cost-effective tasks, this 
illuminates the fact that the regulatory framework is the underlying template for water 
management.  However, discerning observers might note that the risk-based approach 
might be interpreted as the antithesis of an integrated approach working on many 
fronts. Clemett et al (2000) via their major review of water sector programmes provide 
evidence of the dangers of ‘institutional procrastination’ where a focus on long term 
structural change or development of comprehensive networks means that urgent 
operational activities such as the provision of clean water are, or are perceived to be 
neglected.  Could it be that the more integrated we make IWRM, the more we impede its 
deployment?   Perhaps ‘comprehensiveness’ is the factor that slows down progress, and 
that an alternative model should be ‘slim’?  As one Ministry of Water technician in 
Tanzania puts it “We always try to do big, big things when what we really need is small 
small” (Hepworth, 2007).   
  
On a fifth count we ask whether the way that regulatory basin management is packaged 
demotivates those responsible for its delivery.  A rich vein of psychology literature, in 
                                                 
4 With respect to personality and regulatory authority, a body of work on ‘cultural theory’ and its 
application to water resource management may provide new insights for approaches in the field (see 
Jordan and O’Riordan 1997; Langford et al, 1998; van Ogtrop et al, 2005).  
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particular the work of Deci and Ryan (1985) on self-determination, supports this view, 
potentially having far-reaching implications for the way that donor intervention and 
capacity building is practiced. As they explain, events perceived as having an external 
locus of causality, experienced as pressure towards certain outcomes – thus co-opting 
choice – tends to undermine intrinsic motivation, restrict creativity and impair cognitive 
flexibility. Also, when events convey the experience that the person cannot master an 
activity, this promotes perceptions of incompetence - again, undermining intrinsic 
motivation. Is the way that IRBM is being externally framed solving water management 
problems; setting sights too high for current capabilities and restricting creativity and 
action amongst developing country water resource practitioners? 
 
Before the next section discusses answers to the above via an alternative model, we need 
first to return to the relationship between theory and practice which broadly says that 
IWRM or IRBM theory is a package of sensible principles and regulatory frameworks (at 
a strategic level), but that in its practice (the operational level) there is considerable scope 
for interpretation. While this ontological flexibility appears useful and correct, the 
divide between theory and practice may cloud deeper questions about how operation is 
able to transcend it’s higher ‘strategic planning’ parent.  It is the certitude with which 
the IWRM model is held by resorting to and invoking its flexible theory-practice 
framework that this paper takes issue with, precisely because this theory-practice 
framework is not addressing the five points above nor delivering utility in many of the 
Sub-Saharan circumstances the authors have witnessed.  It is not leading to rapid and 
effective progress.  Transcending this inertia requires a theory-practice division but 
constructed around a theory model that generates planning and principles that lend 
themselves to expediency and more rapid implementation. If more utilitarian models of 
theory and practice exist, implications for basin managers, capacity building and donor 
support strategies will be significant.   
 
A polycentric model of river basin management (‘Bazaar’) 
By comparing with cathedral IRBM in Tables 1 and 2, and Figure 1, we formulate some 
preliminary ideas of an alternative ‘bazaar’ model that captures polycentricism, 
personality, pragmatism and problem-solving at the theoretical level. The paper does 
not describe a working polycentric model – instead we infer from field observations that 
a decentralised configuration might assist planning and implementation in certain types 
of river basins.  
 
Our viewpoint that a polycentric model is theoretically and practically appropriate rests 
on the de-merging of the properties of a river basin and of the process to manage it.  
Interpretations of either integration or dissection, and therefore the two models, are 
informed by four ideas of scale (or form and size), a risk-based approach, 
hydrographical regime dissection and time-scheduling (Figure 2).  
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Table 1.  Comparison of two river basin management approaches 
 
Aspect Type Regulatory legal authority integrated water 
resources mgt. ‘Cathedral’ 
Personality authority, polycentric, pragmatic, 
problem-solving water resources mgt. ‘Bazaar’ 
Conditions 
best suited 
for model 
Complex systems, mixed multi-sectoral demands, 
closed basins, mixed quality and quantity issues, high 
degree of urban, industrial and power needs.  
Requirement for transfer of water between sectors.  
Efficiency gains not readily available.   
Basins that can be modularised or nested.  Basins that 
can be monitored with few monitoring points.  Basins that 
can be solved by addressing local water redistribution.  
Efficiency gains achievable.  
Form/Scale Hierarchical, vertical, centralised, basin-
wide 
Distributed, horizontal, decentralised, 
polycentric, nested.  
Risk approach Large number or network of features, 
acts or points  
Small number of features, acts or points to lever 
outcomes.  
Regime phase Tends not to differentiate between supply 
phases 
Employs phases of supply to discern 
management objectives 
River basin 
manage-
ment 
dissect-tion 
Work scheduling Pre-planning, base line surveys, 
composite, on many fronts. 
Immediate, incremental, directly starts to adjust 
today’s practices; deadlines 
Water rights and 
legislation. 
Formalised, denominated, often fixed.  
Statutory and nationally ratified.  
Customary law and reflexive law.  Frequently 
negotiated & adjusted, emphasising 
transparency and proportionality, emphasising 
role of informal legal agreements 
Water rights  
[& obligations] 
A right to a volume 
[To measure water] 
A right to negotiate  
[To agree divisions in water] 
Enforcement To legal standards Informally, to local agreements 
Legislative 
framework 
Pollution control Monitored, standards, regulated. Nested local solutions 
River basin visions Target-led, scenario based 
‘A healthy catchment’ 
Improvement on today.  Conflict resolution.  ‘A 
healthier catchment’ 
Water allocation Via regulatory practice, claim and counter 
claim 
Via dialogue and experimental adjustments; 
incremental 
Dublin Principles Widespread acceptance.  Seeks 
equitable water distribution. 
Locally-set priorities, conflict resolution.  Seeks a 
more equitable distribution of water.  
Water 
allocation 
Negotiation, 
decisions, trades 
Regulator-to-user, Centre to user, user to 
centre.  
User-to-user facilitated by key 
individuals/personalities 
Monitoring of water 
supply 
Formal hydrometric networks, hydraulic 
formality in gauging 
Informal, ad hoc, local knowledge – hydraulic 
informality in gauging 
Data needs Substantial & formal Light & informal 
Decision tools Computer decision support system Informal participatory methods, e.g. River basin 
game 
Science Reasoned, central to the model Reflective, in support, secondary.  
Allocation 
methodology and 
scale 
Demand-derived reconciled at the basin 
level 
Supply-set & cascaded reconciled at the locally 
nested (sub-catchment) level, experimental 
Demand calcs. Formulae, building blocks Incremental adjustment 
Science 
Quanta and 
metrics 
Quantified, modelled, discharge in 
litres/second 
Verbal, look-and-see, percentages 
Subsidiarity Village & irrigation system WUA’s  Multi-layered & catchment WUA’s 
Participation Consultative Substantial (via conflict mediation) 
River basin office Multi-office in foreground of basin mgt. Mini-Office, few people, in background of basin 
mgt. 
Entry points Positions Interests 
Capacity building Training & workshops Mentoring while working 
Instit-
utional 
strength-
ening and 
design 
Role of experts
  
Experts central & leading Experts in support, requested 
Water supply 
provision 
Opts for reticulated supply network, 
large-scale solutions 
Aiming for nested solutions, local recycling and 
storage.  
Infra-
structure 
Distribution 
infrastructure 
Centrally planned, volumetric, formally 
engineered/constructed. 
Locally planned, enhancing  access, 
transparency, flexibility and proportionality 
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Figure 1.  Schematic framework of the two approaches to river basin management 
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Table 2.  Application of two approaches (adapted from observations in Tanzania5) 
 
Regulatory basin wide and national approach (Cathedral) Polycentric approach (Bazaar) 
 Expect large river basins to be complex; maintain sense 
of scale, capturing many stakeholders and sectors. 
 Adopt statutory WRM at national level. 
 Formulate ‘water rights’ IWRM strategy. 
 Sell rights (wet season) to individuals & water user 
associations. 
 Vest power and authority in government institutions to 
manage water.  
 Observe non-functioning of IWRM system. 
 Begin to employ personal dialogue and other solutions to 
ensure water passes downstream. 
 Interpret these basins as being more simple than 
expected, comprising small key sub-catchments as 
manageable ‘modules’. 
 Hold problem-focussed conflict resolution workshop as 
the means to move forward. 
 Scope local & external understanding & solutions of water 
management.  Develop local and community authority to 
manage water.   
 Replicate solutions & bye-laws where possible. 
 Support with additional services and solutions. 
 Observe local and downstream impacts and recursively 
adjust agreements and solutions. 
 
Figure 2.  Integrated and dissected approaches to water resources management 
 
 
 
 
With respect to scale, the hydrological underpinning of a polycentric approach applies 
to basins amenable to nested, modularised (compartmentalised) solutions. This 
effectively means that sub-zones or sub-catchments in the basin are identified wherein 
water balances and institutional logics are resolved internally in order to minimise the 
transaction costs and losses with allocating water across the basin6. This physically 
                                                 
5 See Franks et al (2004) for a description of the case study.   
6 Without being prescriptive, if river basin management covers basins from 1500 to 150 000 square 
kilometres (or more), then a polycentric approach envisages covering parts of these, possibly from 250 to 
20 000 km2 depending on the size and complexity of the basin and component parts.  In addition, sub-
basins can be further divided into sub-catchments.   
Monolithic 
large basin 
Small sub -
basins 
Size/scale/form 
Works on 
large number 
of issues 
Identifies 
key issues 
Risk based approach 
Comprehensive 
work approach 
Rapid 
Work-scheduling 
Does not 
distinguish 
states 
Establishes 
targets in 
three states 
Hydrographic regime 
Dissected polycentric RBM Integrated centric RBM 
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establishes a more decentralised approach but requires sub-zone or sub-catchment-
based water user associations (WUA’s) to distribute water shares that meet internal and 
downstream needs.  Thus, stakeholders have to discern whether the basin can be 
divided into nested manageable catchment units to promote meaningful subsidiarity so 
that rapid intra-unit user-to-user negotiation is made more possible. This is in contrast 
to the cathedral model with a basin-wide scope that then merits additional vertical 
authority and formality and a reliance on data collection and analysis for it to function.  
 
Risk-based approaches and quicker work scheduling function together.  As discussed 
above, risk-based approaches identify tailored key solutions that generate the most 
effective or rapid outcomes and reward7. Scheduling defines the pace with which basin 
management is pursued.  Watkins (1998) and Moore (2004) identify the setting of 
deadlines to force action in this respect.  Thus, a decentralised approach is validated by, 
and insists on ‘quick progress’ in basin management befitting the lack of a more 
comprehensive programme, office and infrastructure. This may be possible because of a 
relatively straightforward challenge of quantitative allocation perhaps underpinned by a 
relatively small number of critical monitoring and flow adjusting points in the basin – 
which in turn need not be formally engineered – and by devolving action to water user 
groups.   
 
Hydrological regime dissection allows the categorisation of key objectives, and is 
effected by dividing a river flow regime into three phases or states of water supply.  
These are ‘critical water’ denoting very small amounts of water availability during 
droughts and dry season; ‘medial water’ for scarce to average flow conditions, and ‘bulk 
water’ for wet to flood conditions (see Lankford and Beale, 2006; Lankford et al, 2007). 
For each state we can consider priorities of allocation and which allocation device 
(markets, command and control, local community responses and other interventions) 
are appropriate for each state.  A look at the Tanzania case study indicates that critical 
and medial water require special attention by the basin office, but that each can be 
addressed by relatively simple, practical and localised solutions rather than by more 
cumbersome formal rights based interventions.  
 
Table 2 demonstrates the differences in interpretation of IRBM theory from the case 
study in Tanzania; the left hand side begins with an assumption of complexity to draw 
up an appropriate regulatory IWRM response, and the right hand side rests on the 
notion that a large river basin might not be that complex (or that at least its complexity is 
understood), and that water allocation between sectors could be effected by relatively 
simple means operating at a local scale. In the case study in Tanzania, this simplicity is 
born of the local observation that the irrigation sector is upstream of environmental and 
hydropower needs and that in many places only a few irrigation intakes significantly 
influence water apportionment for a particular sub-catchment.  Regarding risk based 
approaches, while scientists at a workshop in Northern Nigeria argued for a network of 
                                                 
7 The Pareto principle is an example, where 80% of consequences come from 20% of the causes.  
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standard gauging stations (that would then require formal data collection and use), it 
was possible to identify a few existing points in the basin that could be gauged using 
informal methods, including a landmark large tree and a bridge culvert. The choice here 
is pragmatically informed by work scheduling, scale and risk; how to make progress in 
water management tomorrow – not an abstract ‘tomorrow’ – by using local and existing 
knowledge and infrastructure that meets both local and wider needs. 
 
The regulatory model derives further legitimacy from its use of science – for example 
‘building block computations’ to derive demand quotas which are then used to balance 
available supply. One example is the derivation of crop water requirements and 
irrigation demand that now looks to be outmoded in this respect (Lankford, 2004).  
Scientific methods to determine environmental flow assessment (King and Louw, 1998; 
Pyrce, 2004) appropriate for computational claims on water have to be similarly 
questioned because it is possible, more pragmatically, to ascertain tomorrow’s supply 
quotas by a simple percentage adjustment of today’s supply or by experimentation. 
Continuous adjustments can be made over time to arrive at divisions of water that 
might cascade new practices and efficiencies8.    
 
By contrast, the experience of the authors in gaming as a form of conflict resolution is 
instructive. Lankford et al (2004) used the river basin game to identify and prioritise 
solutions to problems, and to initiate steps to bring those solutions about.  The river 
basin game functions by allowing players to see that adjustments of existing shares is a 
feasible way of progressing in comparison to water demand claims based on 
computations, such as would be found in a water allocation decision support system. 
Conflict resolution could be seen as a defining feature of decentralised basin 
management because it strongly features local problem resolution via incremental steps 
rather than by initiating claims underpinned by a protocol for determining water 
demand; properly conducted, it should speed up solutions and employ risk-based 
approaches.  Conditional agreements between parties, while not legally recognised, 
could refer to customary practices, or be instituted as local bye-laws and other forms of 
reflexive law.  
 
On the basis of the previous two paragraphs we can contrast two methodologies for 
determining basin allocations.  For the regulatory centralised model using decision aids, 
we can see that a new water supply allocation is a function of (St, FV, Dx, Bx, $x, Wx, 
Px), where St = today’s supply pattern; FV = future vision; Dx = modelled demand of 
uses; Vx = benefit of different uses; $x = cost of different uses; Wx = waste in different 
                                                 
8 Note that the UK government part decides an allocation of funds to Universities using ‘annual efficiency 
gains’ of 1-2% not computations of where and how that money is utilised in universities (Greenaway and 
Haynes, 2000).  This is the difference between ‘building block’ calculations of demand and supply forcing 
of demand.  At a recent workshop in South Africa, one author was told of commercial farmers in the 
Oliphants Basin recently agreeing to a decrease in allocation in order to provide water to smallholders 
breaking a deadlock in negotiations.  
Lankford, BA and Hepworth, N, 2007                                                                               DEV Working Paper 02 
 
 18 
uses; Px = participation of users.  For the polycentric, increment-based model, new water 
supply allocation is a function of (St + dS/dt) where St = today’s supply pattern; dS/dt = 
small supply adjustments over time. While the former constructs a model useful for 
some river basins, the latter might usefully bring acceptable progress to others.  One 
example of the incremental approach in Tanzania occurred in the Mkoji subcatchment 
where day schedules were applied and adjusted to provide water to different irrigation 
intakes.   
 
Examples also come from water quality control.  In the cholera outbreak in Dar es 
Salaam which claimed 117 lives in 2006, the city waste stabilisation ponds were 
overlooked despite pathogenic waste passing untreated to a heavily used urban river 
along which many of the cases were found. When asked the reason for this regulatory 
blind spot, various officials responded that they were waiting for a pond rehabilitation 
programme which has been on the table for ten years; that there was a lack of capacity 
for water quality monitoring; that they were waiting for the new water law and new 
institutional arrangements for regulation to take shape.  It seems that the reliance on a 
regulatory model, with the delays in assembling the appropriate finances, infrastructure, 
institutional shape and capacity to get data in place diverted attention from pragmatic 
immediate solutions. The problem - a blocked pipe causing untreated waste to flow 
directly out via a storm overflow, could have been solved by a meeting with the site 
supervisor (who wasn’t aware of the linkages to disease risk) to organise low cost 
maintenance to unblock the pipe (Hepworth, 2007). 
 
The role of the advisory expert is very different in the two models. In the regulatory 
model, the advisory professional manages the regulation of water. As Raymond found, 
the ‘cathedral’ emphasises products generated by specialised experts who consequently 
take a leading role in formulating and owning river knowledge that is then via 
consultation or the market is handed over to or sold to users.  Examples of products are 
water rights, computer decision-aids, highly engineered intake structures and legalised 
claims for water. In the ‘bazaar’, advisory professionals are working much more in 
process mode; allowing knowledge to be requested and framed by many more types of 
water users so that products are produced and owned by them.  In the bazaar, resource 
users stipulate products and solutions that fit their particular locality and solve conflicts 
while recognising wider basin obligations. Examples are mapping services, conflict 
resolution workshops, irrigation infrastructure re-tuning and legal advice.  The 
differences regarding advice, solutions and products between cathedral and bazaar may 
be subtle , but emanate from the manner in which problems are found, elicited and 
validated (considerably more field-tested in the bazaar), and then the manner in which 
solutions are generated (again emphasising local ownership).  Here, communication 
from resource users to a much more responsive basin office is cultivated.  The ‘expert-in-
support’ does not work without recourse to scientific methods and protocols, but 
instead are used when necessary to enrich dialogue. 
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Another example of this difference can be seen in the often-used phrase in IWRM 
‘equitable water supply’.  In cathedral mode, this only has meaning as planning or 
strategic workshop rhetoric and cannot be used to inform real changes.  Rather the issue 
is how to provide a more equitable situation tomorrow that is an improvement on what 
exists today.  One would not even use a phraseology that includes terms such as 
‘equitable’, but to focus on what problems exist – these may be related to crops, or 
livestock conflict, or proportionality, or transparency.   
 
Simplified and appropriate systems of data collection are also effective and in the hands 
of an experienced basin officer reduces the need for expensive monitoring networks and 
lab analysis. Low cost tools such as dipsticks and field testing kit for water quality are 
supplemented by visual and physical inspections (for benthic invertebrates, water 
colour/film, smell, mold, holding of foam, fish behaviour) which cost only time.  The use 
of spot flow-metering equipment and buckets for measuring flows and the use of drain 
tracing dye also provide cheap and immediate field data.  In diagnosing water problems 
such look-and-see approaches, whilst not always able to provide legal evidence, provide 
quick, effective and economic solutions. 
 
The type, application and ownership of basin technology defines and facilitates the 
differences between the two models of basin management.  In Tanzania, for example, 
formal donor programmes have utilised a high level of engineering formality in 
designing basin and irrigation infrastructure. In contrast to this, also in Tanzania and 
Nigeria, local users and projects have explored technical designs that employ materials 
such as stone gabions, log-stops and metal shutters that tend to result in proportional 
division rather than undershot orifice gates favoured by engineers.  At a deeper level, 
these ideas create a platform for giving local users ownership, access and permission to 
constantly re-tune and adjust infrastructure to meet the pace of change in their sub-
catchment, and to ensure acceptable levels of transparency in water division and 
allocation.  The choice of technology – formal or informal – fits the degree of 
pragmatism required within the locality of that nested part of the wider basin.  (Because 
space is limited here, the reader is referred to Lankford and Mwaruvanda (2007) for a 
discussion on appropriate proportional structures that support frequent and nested 
adjustments of water allocation improving knowledge of water distribution without 
recourse to flow measurements).  
 
Further discussion – decentralising certitude 
We argue that the components of each side of Table 1 work in unison to define 
categorically different approaches – while current IRBM is constituted from an 
interlinking of formal and normative building blocks applicable to a hierarchical, 
centralised regulatory approach with basin wide jurisdiction, an alternative applicable 
to, and made possible by sub-basin differentiation, is composed from systems of 
polycentrism, subsidiarity, informality, pragmatism, incrementalism, appropriate 
technology, problem-solving and peer-to-peer dialogue facilitated by individuals or 
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‘personalities’ . It is this contrast that the ‘Cathedral and Bazaar’ organisational 
metaphor captures well.    
 
Rather pessimistically concluding, for seven reasons we do not foresee that polycentric 
‘distributed’ basin management will be forthcoming, even though ideas contained in 
this paper have been recognised and understood by academics and managers.  Feedback 
at several workshops in England, Netherlands and South Africa where the concept has 
been presented indicates both interest and scepticism.  Firstly, we believe such 
scepticism arises because water is seen as multi-functional and integrating, requiring an 
‘integrated’ response at the basin level.  The planning of IRBM, manifest in training 
sessions and workshops, exemplifies this. Few seem willing to interpret river basin 
management as an endeavour that can be simplified and disintegrated (though we argue 
that to discern simplified approaches requires high levels of skills and experience). 
 
The second reason is that scale is invoked as a defence; that large river basins necessarily 
need centralised control and regulation, and that water user organisations have limited 
reach and cannot extend over a great area.  Key here, is the need to conduct meaningful 
analyses of whether basins could be subdivided into modular units that can self regulate 
and be re-constituted into a federalised basin. Just as open source computing is overseen 
by a central administrating unit, we foresee that basin-wide perspectives are still needed 
for the bazaar to function. ‘Foregrounding’ or ‘backgrounding’ this overseeing unit 
would relate to the basin model being pursued, and consequently help define the 
location of managerial authority between this central unit and the polycentric subsidiary 
units.  Modularisation would also lend itself to localised planning and implementation 
of supply systems for small amounts of water, beneficial to households and livestock, 
required during the ‘critical’ state (dry seasons and drought periods).   
 
Thirdly, many water scientists may simply argue that the stakes are too high not to 
introduce a regulatory model – but that more time, finance and training are needed. 
Concerns particularly revolve around the question of how to deal with powerful vested 
interests that require legislative control. (Field research by the authors reveals that many 
such imbalances in Tanzania have never been taken to court, despite the country having 
a sophisticated water law for more than 20 years).   
 
In a related fourth point, even if it could be shown that a pragmatic polycentric model 
complements an eventual move towards formal procedures, many scientists would 
probably argue that it is already captured in the participative dimension of regulatory 
water management.  To answer both of these points, requires further exploration of how 
meaningful subsidiarity at the local level goes beyond current practices of ‘participation’ 
to solve power imbalances.  The ‘bazaar’ does not envisage the absence of courts and 
laws, but does emphasise local informal and reflexive legal institutions and norms. 
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Fifth, the ontological ‘get-out clause’ can be invoked; the defence being that bazaar-type 
approaches are simply operational interpretations of IWRM cathedrals – the latter being 
appropriate for higher level, or national, IWRM planning.   While this may be true, and 
we question this, the onus is on those who promulgate cathedral teaching to also 
provide bazaar methodologies and templates at the same training sessions; currently the 
emphasis appears too much on the former than the latter. 
 
Sixth, the decentralised approach implies a radically different ‘capacity building’ 
cognition. Teaching process operable at a local scale is much more difficult and might 
not be addressed by adjustments to existing courses, i.e. by introducing more role-
playing or specific exercises. The polycentric model would require the formulation of a 
training ‘package’ comparable to that which exists for IWRM – yet as one Environment 
Agency scientist said in 2006 at a meeting in which the Cathedral and Bazaar idea was 
proposed, ‘how could this be done?’  For polycentric water management, training9 
would be scaled back in favour of mentoring, implying a different aid model of long-
term in situ technical assistance by scientists, NGO’s and other support agencies.  
 
Perhaps the more significant, seventh reason would be the political blocks on the 
process of adoption of different models of IWRM – a decentralised model greatly 
increases the independence of basin officers and the responsibility of local users in 
negotiating water and calling in services from providers – in contrast to the state 
sovereignty and command and control embedded in the regulatory model.   
Furthermore, the implication of dysfunctional state regulatory administration may force 
a level of introspection that is unacceptable.   
 
Conclusions 
Should there be an IRBM theory shift, in reality, regarding ‘practice interpretation’, 
actual river basin operations in the future will be a balance between the two models. In 
some river basins there will be a clear case for a well-financed regulatory authority 
deploying centrally planned infrastructure, water measurement and legal safeguards 
against powerful sectoral interests, while in other basins, a basin-centred office would be 
downplayed against support for localised modular sub-units each determining 
particular priorities to meet internal and external objectives.  
 
However, the explorations of the limits of regulatory water management in the UK10, 
Kenya and Tanzania by the Environment Agency are illuminating; yet discussions with 
basin officers as a part of this research indicate that these explorations have not knocked 
the certitude that regulatory command and control are a necessary part of river basin 
management.  While the authors hold an open mind regarding that, we take issue with 
                                                 
9 A move away from the workshop culture, easily recognisable in the majority of development 
cooperation programmes in sub-Saharan Africa, may be unpalatable to various parties (Smith 2003).   
10 The application of the Environment Agency’s Enforcement Policy is a working example of a bridge 
between the regulatory and dialogue based models. 
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the extent to which the principle of ‘ex cathedra’ regulation accrues a comprehensive 
monolithic basin-wide approach (for example see the seven points discussed just above) 
much of which are open to question and need not be automatically adopted in some 
types of river basins.  In this regard, one could empirically argue for polycentric 
possibilities; in other words such is the wide range of institutional and infrastructural 
options available to fit the very large number of basin conditions and contexts found, it 
would be unusual if the basin-wide regulatory model was the only planning format 
going.   
 
Concluding, we argue for much less certitude regarding the regulatory approach.  Water 
managers need a pragmatic theory of water management that generates focussed and 
practical operations. By starting out at the planning level with principles of polycentric 
basin management, one would expect the operational level to adopt these, a process 
with much scope for the interpretation as the right hand sides of Tables 1 and 2 indicate. 
While further thinking is required, it is clear that we and others are legitimately able to 
question the theory and hegemony of ‘integrated’ river basin management given the 
contrasts between a global momentum to actualise it and our grounded observations of 
operational inertia. While adhering to the sentiments of integrated water resources 
management, we shall in some cases need to disintegrate IWRM and IRBM.  
 
It is worth returning to the subject of knowledge frameworks that currently wrap 
around the policy and training of IWRM. We believe that a considerable self-referencing 
system of literature, training and consultancy heavily skews the balance towards an 
integrated regulatory model regardless of circumstances. Little about the use of informal 
field methods, the role of individual personalities, personal experience, step-wise 
progress and practical conflict resolution is taught in formal water training. This is 
indicative. This imbalance means planning and operational designs of IWRM are less 
open to the possibility that progress can be made in a decentralised, modular, informal 
mode, on to which ‘more formality’ and federalisation may be piggybacked in the 
future; ‘start with the bazaar and move to the cathedral’.  Curricula and training on the 
dissection and poly-centralisation of basin management built from ideas around 
scale/form, risk approaches, scheduling and regime states might be a way forward. 
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